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10 YEARS AFTER 9/11: AND STILL FIGHTING NEW 
WARS WITH OLD WEAPONS
why anD how the geneva Conventions Must  
be aMenDeD to Cover al QaeDa
Dominic hoerauF*
i. introDuCtion
The saying “Without security, there is no freedom”1 by the state philosopher Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt is more topical today than ever.  The 9/11 attacks manifested a change of  menaces to our se-
curity, speaking with Humboldt, and hence to our fundamental freedoms and liberties. These threats, 
posed by new asymmetric and denationalized warfare aimed at inducing a state of  terror, present 
new challenges for the defense of  western democracies, specifically to state concepts based on the 
consent of  the governed (states of  consent2).  Although it has been ten years since 9/11, the United 
States still has not managed to fully grasp the unique character of  the “new wars” of  the 21st cen-
tury.3  Neither the United States nor other western governments have generated a consensus on the 
general nature of  the enemy we face.4  Yet, answering this question is a prerequisite for the determi-
nation of  which weapons should be used in order to tackle this phenomenon.  As a result, we still 
try to fight these new wars with tried and trusted “old war” methods of  20th century nation-state wars 
instead of  adjusting our weaponry to the new nature of  the enemies:  denationalized terrorist net-
works such as al Qaeda.  
Unsurprisingly, this incompatibility of  our weapons and the nature of  our enemies compromises 
our contemporary warfare efforts and has essentially dragged the US into one of  the longest con-
* Dominic Hoerauf  is a Fulbright and Ambassadorial Scholar, and 2012 LL.M. candidate focusing on Human Rights 
and the War on Terror at Columbia Law School. He holds a law degree and a Ph.D. from Humboldt University Berlin/
Germany. 
1 See baron wilhelM von huMbolDt, staates 51 the sPhere anD Duties oF governMent 52 (Joseph Coulthoud, 
trans., John Chapman 1854) (1792) (describing the necessity of  state security in a democratic society).
2  PhiliP bobbitt, terror anD Consent:  the wars For the twenty-First Century 182 (2008).
3  See Mary kalDor, new & olD wars:  organizeD violenCe in a global era 169-170 (2d ed. 2007) (analyzing the 
characteristics of  “new war” methodology).
4  See Paul bernan, DeFenDing anD aDvanCing FreeDoM:  a syMPosiuM 23 (2005) (emphasizing the lack of  clarity 
surrounding the new enemy encompassed under the heading of  “terrorism”).
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flicts ever.5  The tools currently at hand, which evolved primarily in the context of  conflicts between 
nation states, do not readily apply to a war on terror that is induced by transnational non-state actors.6  
Not only challenge these shortcomings the effectiveness of  military operations and their supporting 
intelligence activities (warfare in a narrower sense); t hey also, and perhaps more importantly, deprive 
our domestic as well as international legal tools7 of  their legitimacy and of  their effectiveness putting 
at risk the cornerstones of  our constitutional order.8  
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which it had to determine whether 
and to what extent the Geneva Conventions (“GC”) protected alleged al Qaeda captives,9 this in-
compatibility of  tools and tasks became apparent.  Although more than five years have passed, 
neither the outgoing nor the incoming administration has demonstrated the political will to push 
forward possible solutions to close this gap.10  Even though President Obama ordered in 2009 to 
treat Guantanamo detainees in accordance with the Geneva Conventions11 (yet as a matter of  policy 
rather than as a matter of  law), which after all is a positive step, the administration refused to address 
or even acknowledge the pressing need to overhaul the laws of  war.12  More recently, it was not only 
this reluctance to introduce an initiative leading to the reform of  the Geneva Conventions, but also 
the administration’s deliberate leveraging of  this gap by signing into law the National Defense Au-
thorization Act of  2012 (“NDAA”) on December 31st, 2011.13  Section 1021 of  this Act authorizes 
indefinite military detention without any charge or trial, which, given that the military commissions 
reintroduced by Subsection (c)(2) do not represent an adequate trial substitute,14 amounts to nothing 
but a blatant breach of  Common Article 3 GC.15  
One might ask how that is to be reconciled with President Obama’s Executive Order 13,492 
5  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770, 797-98 (2008) (noting that the current conflict “is already among the 
longest wars in American history”).
6  in re guantanaMo bay Detainee litigation, Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention 
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, at 18, Misc. No. 08-442 (Mar.13, 2009), [hereinafter Respondent’s 
Memorandum] usDC DCDC 08-442 (D.D.C filed Aug. 1, 2008) (no. 1689).
7  Eventually, law (and adherence to it) is what makes this system stable and strong; law is our ultimate weapon of  
war. See Charles J. Dunlap, Prepared for the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, law anD 
Military interventions:  Preserving huManitarian values in 21st Century ConFliCts (Nov. 29, 2001) (defining the 
term “lawfare” as the “use of  law as a weapon of  war”).
8  See generally, bobbitt, supra note 2, at 523-24.
9  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
10  See Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1, 6 (highlighting the.  Obama administration’s acknowledgment that 
the laws of  war are “less well-codified with respect to our current, novel type of  armed conflict against . . . al-Qaida” and 
noting that “instead of  proposing an amendment, the government only talks about how domestic provisions should be 
interpreted in light of  this dilemma).
11  See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 § 6 (January 22, 2009).
12  See Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1, 6.
13  National Defense Authorization Act of  (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2012) 
[hereinafter NDAA]. 
14  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729.
15  See, e.g., Jessica Jewell, NDAA violates American Rights (Jan. 23, 2012)., Daily sunDial, http://sundial.csun.
edu/2012/01/ndaa-violates-american-rights/.
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of  2009, which demanded strict compliance with Common Article 3 GC?16  What is the underly-
ing rationale of  the administration’s decision not to veto this bill?  And what was Congress’s motive 
to come up with an act at least in the shadow of  international law?  Upon closer examination, the 
Geneva Conventions themselves give a possible explanation.  Since this framework was obviously 
not designed to deal with transnational actors in the first place and thus to date does not provide 
mechanisms tailored to the specific problems associated with a-national threats, its regulatory reach 
is highly questionable with respect to al Qaeda.17  The result is an international legal grey area that 
poses more questions than it answers.  Whereas President Bush saw no reason to apply the Geneva 
Conventions to al Qaeda fighters,18 the Supreme Court adopted a different position19 that the Obama 
administration, at least at first, seemed to share.20  Given that Congress has just passed the NDAA, 
it must be inferred that Congress by contrast holds another view.21  In light of  the Charming Betsy 
canon,22 Congress most likely considers the Geneva Conventions not to stand in the NDAA’s Sec-
tion 1021’s way.  President Obama for some reason apparently now has yielded to Congress’s pres-
sure, given up his initial plan to veto the bill, and essentially endorsed Congress’ view by signing the 
NDAA into law.23  He has taken advantage of  the confusion already surrounding the relationship of  
the Geneva Conventions and al Qaeda to avoid further domestic disputes, even though this effec-
tively adds to the puzzlement already surrounding the relationship of  the Geneva Conventions and 
al Qaeda.24  
Yet, as this piece argues, a better strategy might have been to push for an amendment of  the Ge-
16  See supra note 11, § 3(a) (Subsection heading:  “Common Article 3 Standards as a Minimum Baseline”).
17  See infra at III.B. (discussing the fractioned decisions in Hamdan and the effect of  the splintered discourse).
18  John D. Rockefeller IV, Release of  Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of  Justice Office of  Legal 
Counsel’s Opinions on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program 13 (April 22, 2009).
19  See generally Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (holding that Guantanamo detainees are protected by the Geneva Conventions).
20  Supra note 11, § 6.
21  See, e.g., Marty Lederman and Steven Vladeck, The NDAA:  The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of  War-Part II, 
lawFare blog (Dec. 2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-war-
part-ii/ (overviewing the background and legislative history surrounding the NDAA).
22   See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (holding that “an act of  Congress ought never 
to be construed to violate the law of  nations if  any other possible construction remains”); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 
F.3d 1, 32-36 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  See generally, Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of  International Law as a Canon of  Domestic Statutory 
Construction, 43 vanD. l. rev. 1103, 1135 (1990) (explaining the history of  the Charming Betsy canon).
23  NDAA, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011); see Mark Lander, After Struggle on Detainees, Obama Signs Defense Bill, new york tiMes 
(Dec 31, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/us/politics/obama-signs-military-spending-bill.html.
24  The European Parliament, for instance, has adopted a resolution (B5-0066/2002) stating that al Qaeda terrorists 
“do not fall precisely within the definitions of  the Geneva Conventions.”  The Bush administration took a similar view 
declaring that they “do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention.”  Office of  Asst. Sec’y of  Def. News Transcript: 
DoD News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002),  http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031.  Contrary 
to this, the Supreme Court held in Hamdan, that at least Common Article 3 of  the Conventions applies. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 
at 567. 
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neva Conventions once and for all.25  For that is what coping with al Qaeda requires us to do:  adapt 
our hitherto applied categories to new realities, leave the dubious shadow of  the law, and look for a 
new international legal approach designed to deal with the nature of  the new enemy26 without aban-
doning the cornerstones of  our constitutional orders.27  Ultimately, the war on terror is nothing but 
a war for the preservation of  our constitutional values and the rule of  law.28  That is why amending 
the laws of  war is the only way we can obtain results that both meet today’s challenges to national 
security and at the same time leave our democratic, rule-of-law oriented heritage untouched.29  Indeed, 
security and liberty are not irreconcilable at all—as some still assert30—but are in fact, as von Hum-
boldt recognized, mutually depending on each other.31  Reconciling national security with the protec-
tion of  basic rights is paramount and insofar predetermining the design of  that new legal category 
we should be looking for when revising the Geneva Conventions.  After all, it is terror that we are 
fighting and not simply the terrorists.32  
In an attempt to show not only why but also how the old weapons need to be overhauled, Part I 
of  this piece first introduces the nation states’ international legal tools derived in the period of  inter- 
and later also intra-nation state wars of  the 20th century.  Part II then analyzes how courts have tried 
to apply these tools, most notably in Hamdan, and why this exercise was bound to fail.  Part III dem-
onstrates why sticking to those tools was and is still not an option for rule-of-law based democracies, 
and why this in fact makes us all the more vulnerable to terrorism.  Finally, Part IV suggests a solu-
tion that both adequately addresses the nature of  the enemy and conforms with our constitutional 
principles.  This ought to clarify both the scope and content of  the Geneva Conventions regarding 
transnational actors with the goal of  removing this grey area of  the laws of  war that allowed the 
passage of  NDAA’s Section 1021.  
25  See, e.g., bobbitt, supra note 2, at 532 (“Because current international law has not caught up with the changes in the 
global strategic context, it seems to present states with an intolerable choice: either follow the rule of  law and sacrifice one 
war aim . . . or dispense with law and sacrifice the legitimacy of  the war effort . . . .  The answer to this dilemma is to reject 
it; law must be reformed.”).
26  Id.
27  Id. at 541 (stating that “[w]e should not abandon the constitutional restraints on the executive that distinguish states 
of  consent”). 
28  Id. at 152.
29  Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere:  Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of  Armed Conflict in the Age of  Terror, 
153 u. Pa. l. rev. 675, 755, 761 (2004) (discussing “twin goals”).  We pursue this second goal for our own sake, not for 
the sake of  the terrorists.  Therefore, it is misguided to argue that al Qaeda members do not deserve due process since 
they are fighting against those very values.  See Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September 11:  History Revisited and 
Law Revised, in new wars, new laws?  aPPlying the laws oF war in 21st Century ConFliCts 75, 117 (David Wippman 
& Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
30  FloriDa international university, at war with Civil rights anD Civil liberties, a Constitutional syMPosiuM 
(2006).
31  von huMbolDt, supra note 1, at 51.
32  bobbitt, supra note 2, at 391.
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ii. the nation states’ international legal tools For the nation state  
wars’ Challenges
A. International Humanitarian Law— 
Concept and History
Although wars have been fought throughout the existence of  mankind, they repeatedly shake 
our societies’ cornerstones—both from a humanitarian and legal standpoint.33  With this in mind, 
and in order to mitigate human plight during wartime, a broad consensus has been reached on a 
regime comprised of  international treaties and customary international law stipulating rules for 
extraordinary times of  war (jus in bello).34  They recognize that no matter how exceptional a situa-
tion becomes, there can be no exception to certain human rights.  That way, those laws of  war try to 
preserve core values even in times of  war.35  
The most prominent set of  such rules is laid down in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Their 
overarching goal is to protect the wounded, prisoners of  war and civilians.36  To that end, they define 
the status, rights, and duties of  enemy nations and of  enemy individuals with respect to wounded37 
or captured soldiers38 as well as civilians39.  Special attention should be given to “Common” Article 
3.  As a provision common to all four Conventions, Common Article 3 establishes non-derogable 
rules prescribing (limited) due process guarantees for wartime detainees by requiring qualified proce-
dures for sentencing captives in order to prevent arbitrary military detention.40  Common Article 3 is 
different from the rest of  the Conventions’ provisions in that it lacks any condition with respect to 
reciprocity.41  Hence, each party has to observe its requisites even if  its opponent does not abide to 
them.  
33  MarCo sassou & antoine a. bouvier et. al., how Does law ProteCt in war 84 (2d. ed. 2003) (citing Frederic 
Maurice:  “War anywhere is first and foremost an institutional disaster, the breakdown of  legal systems, a circumstance 
in which rights are secured by force.  Everyone who has experienced war, particularly the wars of  our times, knows that 
unleashed violence means the obliteration of  standards of  behaviour and legal systems.  Humanitarian action in a war 
situation is therefore above all a legal approach which precedes and accompanies the actual provision of  relief.”).
34  international CoMMittee oF the reD Cross, the geneva Conventions, PreliMinary reMarks 1-2, 5 (1949).
35  sassou & bouvier, supra note 33, at 342.
36  international CoMMittee oF the reD Cross, supra note 34, at 2.
37  The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I] and the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of  the Condition of  Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II].
38  The Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter GC III].
39  The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
40  M. CheriF bassiouni, international CriMinal law 60 (3d. ed. 2008).
41  Int’l Comm. of  the Red Cross, Commentary:  III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War 
35 (J. Pictet gen.ed. 1958) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention Commentary].
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B. 1977:  Responding to Altered Realities
Adopted in post-World War II, the Geneva Conventions were originally designed to regulate 
conflicts between armed forces of  nation states, in other words traditional inter-nation states wars.42  
However, in the two decades following their adoption, more and more intra-nation states armed 
liberation conflicts arose.43  As Common Article 3 provided only limited protection in these cases, an 
additional protocol (AP) to the 1949 Conventions was adopted in 1977. Covering non-international 
armed conflicts, it was exclusively devoted to clashes “which take place in the territory of  a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces”, Article 1(1) AP II.44  Just 
like in Common Article 3 and Article 102 GC III, passing valid sentences under AP II calls for a due 
process minimum provided by courts offering the essential guarantees of  independence and impar-
tiality.45  
iii. new wars, new Challenges—why the  
olD weaPons no longer workeD
A. Today’s Challenges for  
the Geneva Conventions
Although the Conventions and its Additional Protocols have successfully governed several cen-
turies of  armed hostilities between and within nation states, transnational terrorist networks such as al 
Qaeda have suddenly confronted the international regime with new challenges.   As a globally acting 
non-state actor, whose goals (to induce a state of  terror)46 are fundamentally different from those 
of  traditional warfare, al Qaeda raises at least three important questions with regard to the Geneva 
Conventions’ applicability:  (1) whether the Geneva Conventions are after all applicable to the war 
against al Qaeda, and if  so, whether (2) whether detained al Qaeda fighters are entitled to Prisoner-of-
War status under Article 4A GC III or rather only to Common Article 3 guarantees, and; (3) if  the 
Conventions apply, whether the process provided by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) 
is sufficient to fulfill their requirements?
B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, these questions were explored by a U.S. court for the first time.47  Ham-
dan, a citizen of  Yemen, was captured in 2001 by Afghan militia forces and turned over to U.S. 
42  in re guantanaMo bay Detainee litigation, supra note 6, at 1.
43  international CoMMittee oF the reD Cross, inCreasing resPeCt For international huManitarian law in non-
international ConFliCts, ForeworD (2008). 
44  Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 aM. u. l rev. 30-31 (1983).
45  Art. 6(2) aP ii.
46  See kalDor, supra note 3, at 9, 165, 167 (“[T]he main effect of  these attacks is to increase the sense of  insecurity . . . .”)
47  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006).
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military forces, which transported him to the Guantanamo Bay.48  Initially, he was held in the general 
detention facility until 2003, when the President determined that there was reason to believe that 
Hamdan was a member of  al Qaeda or otherwise involved in terrorism directed against the U.S..49  
Due to this finding, Hamdan was placed in solitary confinement as an enemy combatant.50  In 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,51 Hamdan received a formal hearing 
before a CSRT that affirmed his status as an enemy combatant and authorizing his further detain-
ment.52  In 2004, Hamdan petitioned for habeas relief  asserting, inter alia, that being tried solely by 
military commission violated his individual rights as a Prisoner of  War protected by Article 102 (in 
conjunction with Article 4) GC III or, if  he was not entitled to Prisoner-of-War (“POW”) status, his 
rights set forth in Common Article 3.53  
1. Al Qaeda and the applicability of  the Geneva Convention
The District Court of  the District of  Columbia held that, contrary to what the government 
believed, the Geneva Conventions applied to al Qaeda fighters just as they applied to the Taleban.54  
Despite what the President claimed,55 the war against the Taleban was in no way distinguishable from 
the war against al Qaeda.56  And since the Taleban was at that time governing Afghanistan, a party 
to the Conventions, the conflict between the U.S. and Afghanistan constituted war of  international 
character and the Geneva Conventions covered Taleban as well as al Qaeda captives.57  
The United States Court of  Appeals for the District of  Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”), 
however, took a different view and denied the applicability of  the Conventions.58  It concluded that 
the Geneva Conventions contemplated only two types of  armed conflicts (an international conflict 
and a civil war confined to a single country), neither of  which resembled the one at issue.59  Since an 
international conflict requires hostilities between two or more High Contracting Parties, and al Qaeda 
as a non-state actor is neither a state nor a High Contracting party, the court held that the war in 
48  Id. at 557; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572.
50  Id.
51  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
52  Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 36.
53  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 156, 159 (D.D.C. 2004).
54  Id. at 161.
55  Memorandum from the President, to the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of  al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 
(February 7, 2002), available at http://www.library.law.pace.edu/research/020207 bushmemo.pdf.
56  Id. (citing Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of  Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 aM.J. int’l. l. 345, 
349 (2002)) (referring to the common understanding).
57  Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 160-161; see also David Wippman, Introduction:  Do New Wars Call for New Laws? in new 
wars, new laws?  aPPlying the laws oF war in 21st Century ConFliCts 1, 6 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista 
eds., 2005).
58  Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41-42 (deferring to the President’s judgment).  Two Judges held that the Conventions did not in 
any event apply to Hamdan.  Id. at 40–42.
59  Id.
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question could not be categorized as an international conflict.60  Simultaneously, however, it was not 
a “conflict not of  an international character occurring in the territory of  one of  the High Contract-
ing Parties”61 as the war against al Qaeda was a global one.62  Yet, this ruling was overturned by the 
Supreme Court.63  According to its interpretation of  the Geneva Conventions, there was nothing to 
bar its application to alleged al Qaeda captives.64  
2. Level of  protections for al Qaeda captives?
Having affirmed the applicability of  the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda detainees, the District 
Court as well as the Supreme Court were forced to decide which provisions to apply;65 should the 
captives be entitled to POW status and thus enjoy the full range of  privileges the third Convention 
entails?66  This, however, required the captives to meet the test established by Article 4A(2) GC III:  
to wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, not to carry arms openly and to operate 
under the laws and customs of  war.67  
Although it is questionable whether al Qaeda fighters fulfill those criteria,68 the District Court did 
not rule on that issue.69  Instead, it relied on Article 5 GC III to hold that when in doubt about the 
POW status of  a captive70 a prisoner shall enjoy the POW protections until determined otherwise by 
a competent tribunal.  And since the District Court considered the CSRT to not be such a compe-
tent tribunal, it held that Hamdan was entitled to POW status.71  By contrast, the Supreme Court’s 
decision is silent on the question whether Hamdan is entitled to POW status.72  Therefore, neither 
the District Court not Supreme Court fully resolved whether al Qaeda captives are covered by Article 
4A GC III.73
But what did the courts say about Common Article 3?  Do at least those “elementary consider-
60  Id.
61  Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41 (emphasis added).
62  Id..
63  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
64  Id. at 562.
65  The Supreme Court chose Common Article 3, id., at 562 (holding that “[t]he Court need not decide the merits of  
this argument because there is at least one provision of  the Geneva Conventions [referring to Common Article 3] that 
applies here) whereas the District Court applied Article 4 GC III, see 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that 
“Hamdan has, and must be accorded, the full protections of  a prisoner-of-war” under Article 4 GC III until a competent 
tribunal decides otherwise)
66  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 161-162 (D.D.C. 2004).
67  See Article 4A(2) GC III.
68  Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September 11:  History Revisited and Law Revised, in new wars, new laws? 
aPPlying the laws oF war in 21st Century ConFliCts 75, 84 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); see also 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
69  Id.
70  And in this case the Army’s regulations 190-8 provide that Hamdan’s status was in doubt due to his assertion of  his 
entitlement of  POW status.
71  Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 173.
72  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 n.61 (2006).
73  Id.; Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 173.
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ations of  humanity”74 apply to detained al Qaeda operatives?  Contrary to what the U.S. government 
asserted, the District Court held that Article 3 does not only cover domestic conflicts.75  Rather, 
referring to the context in which it was adopted and to statements of  the ICJ, it concluded that the 
U.S. must abide by Common Article 3, regardless of  whether the conflict is international or non-
international.76  The D.C. Circuit took the opposite position, applying Common Article 3 exclusively 
to conflicts of  non-international character “confined to a single country”.77  Though it refused to 
second-guess the President’s judgment that the war against al Qaeda is a conflict distinct from the 
inter-nation state conflict with the Taleban, it confirmed that the former was clearly international in 
scope and thus would not fit the Common Article 3 definition.78  
The Supreme Court, however, considered this reasoning to be erroneous.79  The phrase “not 
of  an international character” was only used as a contradistinction to a conflict between nations.80  
Common Article 3 thus covers all kinds of  clashes between a signatory and a non-state non-signatory 
in the territory of  a signatory,81 hence the war against al Qaeda, too. Since at least Common Article 3 
applies, the Supreme Court refused to decide the questions of  whether the war against the al Qaeda 
is distinct from the war with convention signatory Afghanistan, and whether—as a consequence—
Hamdan is a prisoner of  war.82  
3. Do CSRT procedures satisfy Common Article 3?
With respect to  whether the CSRT hearings provided the level of  procedural protection re-
quired by Common Article 3, the District Court did not adopt a clear position.83  It concluded that 
the CSRT did raise due process concerns, insofar as the defendant could be excluded from his trial 
in order to protect classified evidence and that evidence may be used which the defendant never 
gets to see.84  However, the Court refused to decide whether the CSRT met the standards Common 
Article 3 prescribes.85  
74  Nicaragua v. United States, I.C.J. 14, 114 (1986).
75  Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 162-163.
76  Id.
77  Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41-42.
78  Id. at 42.
79  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).
80  Id.
81  Id.
82  Id. at 562 (“The Court need not debate the merits of  that argument here because there is at least one provision . . . 
that applies here even if  the relevant conflict is not between signatories.”).
83  344 F.Supp.2d 152, 166 (2004).  It only held that the CSRT was not a competent tribunal as prescribed under Article 
5 GC III, id. at 173.
84  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp.2d 152, 166 (D.D.C. 2004).
85  The District Court only found that the CSRT was not a competent tribunal to determine Hamdan’s status under the 
Geneva Conventions, see 344 F. Supp.2d 152, 162 ( “There is nothing in this record to suggest that a competent tribunal 
has determined that Hamdan is not a prisoner-of-war under the Geneva Conventions.  Hamdan has appeared before 
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, but the CSRT was not established to address detainees’ status under the Geneva 
Conventions.”).
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By contrast, the Supreme Court made its views on that issue known.86  In its opinion, the 
military commission not only lacked jurisdiction,87 it also failed to respect the essential guarantees 
required by Common Article 3.88  Although Common Article 3 does not define “all the judicial guar-
antees . . . recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples . . . it must be understood to incorporate 
at least the barest of  the trial protections recognized by customary international law.”89  Denying a 
detainee the opportunity to be present during the course of  his own trial and denying his ability to 
see all evidence introduced against him indisputably violates customary international law both in 
structure and procedure.  Thus, the CSRTs fall  short of  the standard practices of  customary inter-
national law established by Common Article 3.90  
C. Open Questions
Despite this clear statement regarding the CSRTs shortcomings and its lack of  jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court unfortunately did not answer all the questions presented by this case in a fully per-
suasive manner.  
First, it is unclear why the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of  whether Article 4 
applies.  Though the Court concluded that Common Article 3 applies,91 such does not exempt the 
Court from reviewing the applicability of  Article 4 GC III.  Lower courts have disagreed on which 
provision to apply.92   Besides, due to the different levels of  protection, it does make a difference 
whether Hamdan is entitled to POW status (or only to the “minimum” guarantees of  Common 
Article 3).93  Even though it is hard to believe that Hamdan could make a case insofar (owed to his 
affiliation with al Qaeda rather than with the Taleban), the Supreme Court should have addressed that 
issue.  
Second, despite the fact that the Supreme Court held that alleged al Qaeda captives were pro-
86  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 560 (holding that “[t]he military commission at issue lacks the power to proceed because its 
structure and procedures violate . . . the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949”).
87  Id. at 563-64 (due to the absence of  an offense against the laws of  war committed in the theater of  war).
88  Id. at 564 (stating that “[t]he procedures adopted to try Hamdan deviate from those governing courts-martial in ways 
not justified by practical need, and thus fail to afford the requisite guarantees”).
89  Id. at 564.
90  Id.
91  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 562 (holding that “[t]he Court need not decide the merits of  this argument [whether the conflict 
against al Qaeda constituted a different conflict from the one against the Taleban and therefore whether Hamdan was 
entitled to POW status under Article 4 GC III] because there is at least one provision [Common Article 3] of  the Geneva 
Conventions that applies here even if  the relevant conflict is not between signatories.”).
92  Compare the District Court’s holding (344 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 applying Article 4 GC III) with the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding (415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (finding that “One problem for Hamdan is that he does not fit the Article 4 
definition of  a ‘prisoner of  war’ entitled to the protection of  the Convention. He does not purport to be a member of  a 
group who displayed ‘a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance’ and who conducted ‘their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of  war.’”).
93  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-30 (discussing the distinction between Convention protections for a detainee captured 
pursuant to the war against the Taliban and one captured in the war against al Qaeda).
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tected by Common Article 3,94 it failed to provide  persuasive reasoning why.  While the conventions 
should be broadly interpreted in accordance with its object and purpose,95 One cannot ignore the 
fact that neither the language of  Common Article 3 nor its history supports the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation.  As the Supreme Court points out, the goal of  Common Article 3 was “to furnish 
minimal protection to rebels involved in one kind of  ‘conflict not of  an international character,’ i.e., 
a civil war..”96  Therefore, the term “conflict of  non-international character” must be understood to 
cover domestic conflicts only.97  This interpretation is supported by the plain language of  Common 
Article 3, which states that according to which it is to apply exclusively to non-international con-
flicts “occurring in the territory of  one of  the High Contracting Parties.”98  This clearly limits the very 
“general” and “vague” scope of  the expression “conflict not of  an international character”99 and 
ties Article 3 to domestic hostilities.100  Concededly, the Supreme Court is right in saying that “further 
limiting language that would have rendered Article 3 applicable especially [to] cases of  civil war, co-
lonial conflicts, or wars of  religion” was omitted from the final version,101 suggesting a broad scope 
of  application so as to include transnational hostilities.102  Nevertheless, one cannot ignore that the 
parties also refrained from removing the narrowing criteria “occurring in the territory of  one of  the 
High Contracting Parties,” which, if  Common Article 3 was not intended to be limited to domestic 
conflicts, was not necessary.103  
Article 3’s limitation to domestic conflicts can also be inferred from the examples provided in 
the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions.104  In providing examples to be covered under Article 
3, the Commentary exclusively describes situations where insurgents or rebellions fight a de jure 
government inside the government’s territory.105  Taking a closer look at the drafting history and the 
motives for Common Article 3 further supports this conclusion:  first the “[p]arty in revolt” needed 
“an authority responsible for its acts . . . [and must be] acting within a determinate territory [with] 
the means of  respecting . . . the Convention”106  Another requirement set forth in the Commentary 
was “[t]hat the insurgent civil authority exercise de facto authority over persons within a determinate 
94  See id. at 562 (“Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection . . . to individual associated with 
neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory who are involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of ’ a signatory.”).
95  See id. at 631 (citing the Third Geneva Convention Commentary 36-37).
96  Id.
97  Id.
98  Int’l Comm. of  the Red Cross, Commentary: III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War 
28 (emphasis added).
99  Third Geneva Convention Commentary, at 35.
100  Wippman, supra note 57, at 5.
101  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.
102  Id.
103  GC III, supra note 38, at art. 3.
104  Third Geneva Convention Commentary, at 36.
105  Id. at 35.
106  Id. at 36.
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portion of  the national territory”.107  Absent a traditional command hierarchy, al Qaeda fulfills neither 
of  the criteria appearing to be tailored to domestic insurgent groups.108  The reasons for drafting 
Common Article 3 further underline this finding. The Commentary reads:  “. . . “the Red Cross has 
long been trying to aid the victims of  civil wars and internal conflicts, the dangers of  which are some-
times even greater than those of  international wars.”109  This emphasis on domestic conflicts clearly 
indicates that the Red Cross, the architect of  the Geneva Conventions, intended the terminus technicus 
“conflict not of  an international character” to be interpreted as hostilities taking place within one 
country only. 
Based on those criteria, the war against al Qaeda, taking place not only in the U.S. but also in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, can hardly be categorized as a Common Article 3 conflict for it 
is not confined to one country.110  However, as this is exactly what Common Article 3 requires, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan is, from a purely legal standpoint, arguably questionable.111  
D. Interim Finding
These deliberations reveal unsatisfying regulatory gaps between tried and trusted frameworks 
and new realities, all of  which raise crucial questions about whether the Geneva Conventions are in 
fact still suited to cope with this new kind of  war.112  As this analysis concludes:  they are not.  Even 
the Supreme Court’s attempt to use nation states’ weapons for transnational threats is, as demon-
strated, far from being convincing.113  That is not to say, however, that al Qaeda fighters should not 
be treated in accordance with Common Article 3.  Policy-wise and through the lens of  the state of  
consent, the Supreme Court has made the right decision. But given the nature of  Common Article 
3, under the separation of  powers doctrine this was not its call to make.114  The 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, as of  today, simply do not apply to transnational terrorist groups.115  
107  Executive Power – Military Commissions – D.C. Circuit Upholds the Constitutionality of  Military Commissions for Guantanamo 
Bay Detainees – Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 119 harv. l. rev. 1606, 1612 (2006).
108  See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention Commentary 28 (discussing “a certain number of  conditions on which the 
application of  the Convention would depend”). 
109  Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
110  See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address from the White House (Sept. 6, 2006) (announcing a global war on 
terror:  “To win the war on terror, we must be able to detain . . . terrorists captured here in American and on the battlefields 
around the world”) (emphasis added).
111  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see also GC III, supra note 41, at art. 3.
112  See Newton, supra note 29, at 84 (“September 11 did serve to highlight a gap in the law between lawful combatants, 
who are governed by clear legal norms, and innocent civilians, whom international law seeks to protect to the maximum 
degree feasible from the effects of  armed conflict.”).
113  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557. 
114  As Charles-louis MontesQuieu-louis MontesQuieu, De l’esPrit De loi, l.xi, chapter VI (1748), put it, the 
Judiciary is just the mouth of  the law, not its creator (“les juges de la nation ne sont . . . que la bouche, qui prononce les 
paroles de la loi.”).  De l’esPrit Des lois, 149 (1748).  It thus has no competence to deliver judgments outside the law. 
115  Newton, supra note 29, at 84 (“As private terrorists waging war against the sovereign states of  the world, al Qaeda 
members do not meet the criteria in the Third Geneva Convention for status as prisoners of  war.  At the same time, they 
do not qualify for the protections accorded innocent civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention.”).
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iv. why new Constitutional orDers Call  
For new legal tools
So what, if  anything, needs to be done?  We need to craft new weapons for new wars.  Instead 
of  operating outside the law and watching the Judiciary struggle to apply outdated weapons to new 
wars’ challenges, the Executive and the Senate should consider refining the laws of  war and amend-
ing the Conventions to cover al Qaeda captives.  This is particularly necessary since conflicts involv-
ing transnational actors are only incompletely governed by customary international law.116  Congress, 
together with the Executive must therefore construct new legal tools required by challenges posed 
by the current conflict.117  
And even in the meantime, the U.S. is well-advised to refrain from authorizations such as the 
Sec. 1021 NDAA and to return—as it first did under President Obama—to the practice of  previous 
administrations that applied Article 3 as a matter of  policy.118  This is what our rule-of-law heritage 
requires us to do.  This is what our constitutional order as states of  consent require us to do, and 
this is what distinguishes us from the terrorists.119  Our system, guided by the rule of  law, provides 
individuals whose rights are infringed upon by the state with some kind of  due process.120  And 
“due process does not perish when war comes”.121  In fact, preserving the state of  consent against 
forces advocating a fundamental departure from the mechanisms that ensure our current ordre public 
essentially means upholding the former’s cornerstones:  our democratic and rule-of-law-influenced 
moral and ethical principles.  Holding on to those principles is therefore especially crucial in rough 
times.122  In order to achieve that, “our means must be guided by our ends”.123  As consequentialist 
Machiavelli might have put it:  Do not compromise our values! For abandoning our values is equiva-
lent to giving up the state of  consent,124 yielding to terror, and giving in to terrorism.  In the end, we 
are rather fighting terror (the terrorists’ aim, which is the collapse of  our constitutional order), as 
mentioned earlier, than we are fighting terrorists (actors).125  Terror is achieved either when people 
116  Wippman, supra note 28, at 6 (“First, some academics and human rights activists . . . have expressed concern that 
recent trends have exposed inadequacies in the protection afforded civilians.”). 
117  See id. at 6 (“ . . . human rights activists view with alarm U.S. tactics in the fight against terrorism, and some seek 
modifications to the law that would constrain possible excesses in that fight.”).  
118  bobbitt, supra note 2, at 463.
119  Id. at 541.
120  See U.S. Const. amend. V.
121  Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
122  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 2648 (2004) (holding that “[i]t is during our most challenging and uncertain 
moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must 
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad”).  Even “[i]n new wars, all sides violate 
the laws of  war and human rights law.  [Yet] the[t]he task of  legitimate security forces is to . . . act in support of  the rule 
of  law.”  kalDor, supra note 3, at 174.  
123  bobbitt, supra note 2, at 531.
124  See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of  national defense, 
we would sanction the subversion of  one of  those liberties . . . which makes the defense of  the Nation worthwhile.”).  
125  bobbitt, supra note 2, at 391.
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are “dissuaded from doing what they have a lawful right to do”126 (positive element) or when they 
or their institutions both intentionally and systematically breach their most fundamental obligations 
(negative element), which are  essential to our system of  social compact. Primarily the latter is at 
stake here.  To put it differently, coping with al Qaeda has tempted the Bush administration to ignore 
the very fundamental obligation to stay true to our rule-of-law heritage.  As Bobbitt observed, “[w]hat 
is threatened is threatened by our own actions when we are persuaded that compromises with our 
constitutional traditions of  consent are necessary to protect us.”127  We should not let this happen, as 
this means that have not only lost a battle against the terrorists, but the whole war.  
v. how the Conventions  
shoulD be aMenDeD
With that being said, the goal that the revised Geneva Conventions need to pursue is sketched 
out: a return to the rule of  law by amending the Geneva Conventions in a way to cover al Qa-
eda.  Instead of  squeezing this new phenomenon into existing boxes, the High Contracting Parties 
should create a new one, a third box of  conflict categories:  a transnational one128 in addition to 
the international and domestic categories.129  They should adapt the framework to altered realities 
and stop adding to the already existing confusion surrounding the reach of  the Conventions with 
respect to al Qaeda, confusion caused by the incompatibility of  tools and tasks.130  This Third-box 
approach should be preferred over Ehrenreich’s suggestion to abolish all categories of  conflict from 
the conventions,131 as the latter could not adequately satisfy needs for different protection levels in 
different kind of  conflicts.
Such provisions on transnational conflicts need to stipulate rules that are tailored to the special 
character of  transnational actors like terrorists and at the same time be consistent with state of  con-
sent’s foundations.  The latter requires us to acknowledge that wars have changed:  wars no longer 
have a clear-cut beginning and end,132 there is no precisely definable battlefield, enemy association 
(the central concept of  the Geneva Conventions133) is no longer evident, the dividing lines between 
civilians and soldiers have been blurred (inasmuch as has the distinction between internal and exter-
nal conflicts134), and the distinction between peacetime law and the laws of  wars has become vague.  
As a result, coping with al Qaeda forces us to overcome the dualism of  the latter two categories and 
126  Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
127  bobbitt, supra note 2, at 540.
128  Decoupled from the criterion “statehood.”
129  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135, 136 (stating that the Geneva Convention will apply to “declared war(s)” between countries).
130  See supra Part III.B.1. 
131  Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 29, at 755-56.
132  bobbitt, supra note 2, at 455.
133  Robert Chesney, Who May Be Held?  Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 b.C. l. rev. 769, 794 (2011).
134  kalDor, supra note 3, at 123.
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accept that there are now multiple layers in between.135  Even within this war, it does make a differ-
ence, from a due process standpoint, if  you arrest somebody on the hot battlefield in Afghanistan 
(Hamdi), in Bosnia (Boumediene) or in Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport (Padilla).136  Yet, as a 
general rule, the laws of  (transnational) wars have to reduce its distance to (domestic) peacetime 
law,137 insofar as their subjects (at least in Padilla/Boumediene constellations) resemble more and more 
subjects of  peacetime law.138  In concrete terms, this means that—in the detention context—the 
procedures prescribed internationally for detention during the war on terror should move closer to 
a basic standard of  due process granted in cases of  criminal detentions, particularly for captures far 
away from the hot battlefield.
Most importantly, this necessitates a heightened standard of  detention review, for three pri-
mary reasons.  First, the current provisions authorize detention of  combatants “till cessation of  
conflict”.139  Given the nature of  the war on terror, this leads de facto to indefinite detentions—who 
can predict when, if  ever, this war will definitely be over?140  Second, in the absence of  a well-
defined battlefield or visible combatant features such as uniforms or openly carried weapons, it is 
increasingly difficult to identify the enemy for certain141 which carries a heightened risk of  errone-
ous detention—unless, of  course, the detainee is caught in the act of  fighting.  And third, assuming 
such an erroneous capture took place, the limited procedural options the detainee has at this point 
of  time deprive him of  his right to effectively challenge his detention: he does not get to see classi-
fied evidence,142 hearsay is accepted, the some evidence standard is applied, and he has no access to legal 
counsel.143  In these three aspects, the new global and denationalized wars are remarkably different 
from nation state wars.  Ignoring these differences by persistently applying nation states’ “one size 
fits all” tools leads to results outside of  the law—especially in Padilla or Boumediene situations far away 
135  See The Place of  Human Rights in the War on Terrorwar 21st (examining whether to apply criminal law during wars); 
Wippman, supra note 57, at 1-2.  But see Wippman, supra note 29, at 6, 53-54. 
136  See also “three part test” established by Justice Kennedy in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, ___ (citing Johnson 
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
137  See Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of  Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 stan. 
l. rev. 1079, 1096 (2008).  The Court appropriately calls this a “convergence pressure.”  Id. at 1131. 
138  In the absence of  openly carried weapons and military uniforms, it is often difficult to distinguish terrorists from 
civilians and thus to identify the former as belligerents.  Especially, when apprehensions take place far away from the 
battlefield, it can be challenging to prove a belligerency affiliation.  Consequently, those persons are rather tried under 
criminal law.  See Associated Press, Jose Padilla sentenced on terrorism charges (Jan. 1, 2008), available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/22784470/#.T1qaKnlnDLs, and for the case of  Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who was arrested in 
Illinois, see John Schwartz, Admitted Qaeda Agent Receives Prison Sentence, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/us/30marri.html?_r=1.
139  See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 
(1955). 
140  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 2277 (2008).
141  Many captures are taking place in a civilian rather than in a combat setting, see Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, 
supra note 137, at 1100. 
142  And in the wars of  the 21st century where the importance of  intelligence increases and consequently more and more 
information is classified, it is more likely that the actual grounds for detention cannot be revealed.
143  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527-28 (2004). 
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from the hot battlefield. Yet, as pointed out above, this is unacceptable in a state of  consent.  Inter-
estingly, the Supreme Court seems to arrive at the very same conclusion when it held in Hamdi, and 
Hamdi was indeed caught on the hot battlefield(!), that the procedures then in place did not pro-
vide a ”“meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis of  his detention”..”144  Four years later, 
the Supreme Court reiterated its discontent with the standard of  detention review in its Boumediene 
decision:145  
“At the CSRT stage the detainee has limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the 
Government’s case, does not have the assistance of  counsel, and may not be aware of  the most criti-
cal allegations that the Government relied upon to order his detention.  His opportunity to confront 
witnesses is likely to be more theoretical than real, given that there are no limits on the admission of  
hearsay.  The Court therefore agrees with petitioners that there is considerable risk of  error in the 
tribunal’s findings of  fact.  And given that the consequence of  error may be detention for the dura-
tion of  hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk is too significant to ignore.“.” 
Even though the Hamdi and Boumediene rulings facially measure the al Qaeda detentions solely 
under US domestic law, they both can be described as decisions “rendered in the shadow of  inter-
national law.”146  Since the Supreme Court’s motives for establishing the three part test in Boumedi-
ene147 was mainly countering the newly heightened risk of  erroneous and indefinite detention, those 
guidelines are useful in our context, too (primarily the criteria locus of  apprehension and practical 
obstacles to habeas review).  
With this in mind, amendments to the Geneva Conventions not only need to create a category 
for transnational conflicts that provides for procedures reflecting the factual differences between 
transnational and nation states’ fighters, but also need take into account the different apprehension 
constellations global terrorism confronts us with.  That means the transnational conflict category 
must provide for a range of  due process levels.  At a minimum, the guarantees under Common 
Article 3 must apply to all al Qaeda members caught on the hot battlefield (Hamdi). For apprehen-
sions made on the outer boundaries of  the “lukewarm” battlefield (Boumediene), there should be a 
category affording an intermediate level of  due process.  Finally, persons captured far away from the 
active theatre of  war (Padilla/Al-Marri) should be entitled to procedural guarantees similar to those 
afforded in criminal proceedings.
But who gets to decide which apprehension constitutes a hot, lukewarm, or offsite capture?  
Who gets to review the evidence supporting the authorization of  detention?  Since there is no dis-
pute over the fact that there are state secrets that cannot be disclosed, special domestic courts should 
be set up (similar to the FISA Court) to hear those habeas cases in an effort to compensate for evi-
dence that needs to remain classified but also to be reviewed by a neutral decision-maker. It should 
be this court to ultimately decide which of  the three proposed levels of  procedural safeguards is 
144  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
145  Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2269.
146  Due to the fact that the Supreme Court borrowed concepts in this decisions from international humanitarian and 
incorporated those into its own interpretation of  the U.S. Constitution and statutes.  See David D. Caron, International 
Decisions, 98 aM. J. int’l l. 782, 786-287 (2004).
147  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 2236-38 (2008).
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actually due.
vi. ConClusion
Granting procedural baseline guarantees even to our worst enemies is, inter alia, what distinguish-
es states of  consent from those of  terror, and is what constitutes the basis of  our constitutional 
order.  Applying the definition of  terror introduced earlier, deviating from these state of  consent 
standards ultimately amounts to a fundamental breach of  our system-defining obligations and thus 
fulfills the second (the negative) criterion of  the definition.  Abandoning our fundamental values and 
rule-of-law achievements is not only delegitimizing our government, but equivalent to surrendering 
to the state of  terror.  This is why the U.S. should not unilaterally sacrifice rights and values fun-
damental to our constitutional order on the altar of  national security,148 as it did with NDAA’s Sec. 
1021, but initiate negotiations that ought to lead to the amendment of  the Geneva Conventions.  As 
President Roosevelt put it:  “Freedom means the supremacy of  human rights everywhere.”149 
By demanding a de facto due process extension, the Supreme Court seems to have understood 
the need for convergence between peace- and wartime detention.  But in the absence of  modern, 
adequately adapted legal tools at hand, it overstepped its powers applying provisions that are in fact 
not applicable.  This struggle perfectly demonstrates the urgent necessity of  new legal mechanisms, 
of  “new weapons” for the “new wars.”  This is why the U.S. government should introduce proposals 
for a reform of  the Geneva Conventions in the aforementioned manner.  In 1977, the Geneva Con-
ventions were successfully amended to cope with new realities.  Why should that not work again?  
As Wippman has put it:  in the past century, the laws of  wars have been substantially revised every 25 
to 30 years by major new treaties; by that standard, we are now due for another revision.150  
Despite that the reality that national security is a key factor for the states of  consent, and deten-
tion of  al Qaeda captives remains critical, so too is the state’s duty to ensure and respect individual 
rights and liberties (even those of  our enemies), and to adhere both to the rule of  law and to our 
moral principles.  Of  course, von Humboldt is right in saying that without security there is no lib-
erty.  But, particularly in a state of  consent that defines itself  by the protection of  human rights and 
the adherence to the rule of  law, it is also true that without fundamental freedoms—protected by 
mechanisms guaranteeing due process—security is only of  very limited use.  
148  In Re Directives (FISA Court of  Review), 551 F.3d 1004, 1116 (2008).
149  Franklin D. roosevelt, the Four FreeDoMs aDDress to Congress 77 Cong. Record 87, Pt. I. (1941), available at 
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/pdfs/fftext.pdf. 
150  Wippman, supra note 29, at 1-3.
